Electoral Frequency and Legislative Volatility

Key Insight

Democracies face a dilemma regarding election frequency: long intervals risk state overthrow due to intense competition and despair among losing parties, potentially driving ambition to 'desperate lengths.' Conversely, frequent elections, chosen by Americans, lead to a 'feverish activity' in society and 'constant volatility' in public affairs, promoting legislative instability. This choice was driven by democratic instinct, which 'stimulates the taste for variety to the point of passion,' rather than pure reason.

The consequence of this preference for frequent elections is a 'singular mutability in legislation.' Despite many Americans recognizing instability as a 'great evil,' they view it as a necessary outcome of their system. Key figures like Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson all expressed concerns about this legislative inconstancy. Hamilton highlighted the 'mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws which forms the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our governments' (Federalist 73).

Madison noted that 'the facility and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable' (Federalist 62). Jefferson, a strong proponent of democracy, also pointed to the 'immense evil' of law instability. He even suggested a constitutional provision requiring a twelve-month period between engrossing and passing a bill, only allowing a speedier passage with a two-thirds majority in both houses, underscoring the severity of the issue and the need for structural remedies to temper democratic impulsiveness.